Sommaire: 25 September 2007, Washington DC - Speech by Mr Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, "What's the future for EU enlargement?" delivered at the German Marshall Fund of the United States
Excellency, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear friends,
It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon to discuss enlargement of the European Union with such a distinguished audience. I am particularly pleased to be hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, for several reasons.
First, there's my firm belief in the transatlanticism promoted by George Marshall himself. Both he and George Kennan believed in using economic and political means together to defend freedom and promote prosperity - and we are now using these tenets in enlargement policy now.
Second, I'm pleased to be here because of my respect for the work of the GMF, the most recent example of which is the Transatlantic Trends survey released this month, which provided with important food for thought across Europe and the United States. I find the results on Turkey fascinating - if not necessarily pleasant news for my job. Transatlantic Trends is a significant input for our policy-making.
And third, there's my personal regard for Marc Grossman and Ron Asmus. Both are great policy entrepreneurs and builders of bridges to and from Turkey. In Brussels, Ron is regarded as the most effective ambassador for the transatlantic partnership. It's no exaggeration to say that Ron's work at the GMF centre in Brussels has improved the quality of the European debate about foreign policy - quite an achievement for American soft power!
Ladies and gentlemen,
The title of my speech today is "What's the future for EU enlargement?". The answer is simple: enlargement remains a vital part of the EU's external policies, because it is our most powerful foreign policy tool. We cannot use it in our whole neighbourhood. Our agenda for enlargement is South-Eastern Europe - that is, the Balkans and Turkey have the prospect of membership. We are cautious in taking on new commitments, to avoid overstretch. We want to ensure our commitments are real and credible.
However, where we can use the prospect of membership as an anchor for democratic transformation, difficult reforms and enhancing freedoms, we must use it to the maximum.
George Marshall saw the need to build bridges and cooperate with nations behind the Iron Curtain - what you might call "containment and cooperation". I see that approach as the right one for Europe to deal with what many people see as the new ideological enemy, following the end of the Cold War - radical Islam.
This debate about how to deal with radical Islam is one of the reasons why Turkey is a central part of the debate about further enlargement of the EU. In my view, Turkey's accession process is the best way to engage with the most important community of Muslims on our doorstep, and to enhance the spread of democracy and understanding between faiths.
There will inevitably be ups and downs in our relationship with Turkey over the years ahead, and Member States will raise further question-marks about some of the other chapters from time to time. This debate is a necessary part of the accession process. Turkey's negotiations were always going to be a long-term effort, one which has to ride out political storms in Ankara, Brussels and other capitals. The accession process is a marathon, not a sprint. The important thing is to maintain the
forward momentum in the process, to keep Turkey motivated to continue its reforms, and to maintain our mutual commitment to Turkish integration into the EU.
In my view, the most valuable part of this process will be the transformation of Turkey into a more open society with rich cultural diversity and a strong commitment to the values shared by all Europeans. The EU accession process has long been an important anchor for the country's democratic transformation, tested again this year.
I was thus worried to read in Transatlantic Trends 2007 of a 14 percentage point drop over the past year in the number of Turks viewing EU membership as a good thing, down to only 40 per cent support. That shows what a direct and immediate effect the statements of European leaders can have in Turkey. It's also concerning that Turkish respondents are more pessimistic than Europeans about whether Turkey will eventually join the EU - 56 per cent of Europeans think Turkey is likely to join, but
only a quarter of Turks believe it.
These findings are worrying, but they also show the potential transformative power of the accession process. If we stick to our word and show an unequivocal commitment to Turkey joining once it meets the conditions, we will see the results in Turkey's transformation into a more open, democratic and self-confident society.
We need to help the new government in Ankara to do its job well in reforming Turkey, by reaffirming the EU's commitment to our mutual goal of membership. The ball is in Turkey's court, because it is concrete reforms that will move Turkey forward, but the EU must be ready to reward the country's progress. That's fair play.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
An American audience is bound to pose the question: Why is the idea of Turkey joining the EU still so controversial? Sometimes I get the impression that people in the rest of the world can't see why Europeans have so many concerns about it. It might seem that Turkish membership of the EU is a "no brainer". The EU has obvious interests in integrating Turkey fully into its policies and institutions, given the valuable role that the country could play in so many policy areas, ranging from energy
security to combating terrorism, from furthering stability in the Middle East to promoting a market around the Black Sea.
The EU is currently thinking about the idea advanced by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, of setting up some kind of reflection group to consider the EU in 2020-2030. I have no doubt that, if this group has a wide mandate across all the strategic questions facing the EU in that timeframe, Turkey will emerge again and again not as a problem, but as a vital part of the solution to Europe's most pressing concerns - from climate change to economic competitiveness, from pipelines to foreign
policy.
So why are so many European nervous? The answer is that Turkey raises fundamental questions about the European Union itself, as well as about the country's own future development. Turkey could be the largest member state, if current population trends continue, and it would give the EU borders to Iran and Iraq. These facts shake up the mental maps of Europeans who remember European integration starting around the Rhine.
Think about how the American public would react if the presidential candidates for 2008 started proposing that Mexico should become the 51st state for reasons of national strategic interest. The first questions people would ask would be about migration, culture and borders - not because there are no strategic issues, but because of the mental images that the idea evokes.
Much of the debate in Turkey is in fact about our internal debate about migration. People fear that Turkey joining the EU will mean unwelcome further immigration. In practice, this is unlikely to be a major policy problem by the time Turkey joins - because the EU labour market and demographic profile will have changed so much by then. In any case, the EU has policy tools to address any potential problems.
The Mexico parallel gives you an idea of how touchy this subject is to working people. Imagine the likely reaction to a proposal to extend NAFTA to include free movement of labour from Mexico. You can now see how the European debate looks.
It takes time for strategic arguments to gain traction in the public debate, and for people to get used to the idea of a differently shaped map on the wall. Over the years ahead in the accession process, we should communicate more effectively about how Turkey is changing. Likewise, we should ensure a better-informed debate about the likely future of the EU, and Turkey's potential role in the Union.
I'd like to move on to an interactive discussion, so I will conclude with some points about one of our biggest joint policy challenges just now - Kosovo. NATO and the EU need to work effectively together in this part of Europe, even more than any other.
Once the process to determine the future status of Kosovo reaches its conclusion in December, Europeans and Americans must unite to ensure a clear and sustainable outcome. Kosovo will be a severe test for us all - of the EU's foreign policy, and of the EU and US capacity to ensure effective and responsible multilateralism.
The European Union is working to achieve a negotiated solution. We are leaving no stone unturned. But we expect both sides at the negotiating table to reach a settlement and stick to it.
We in the Commission are already working hard to ensure that we are ready to deliver what the international community promises in terms of support - financial, technical and political - to ensure implementation of the status settlement. We cannot fail in this endeavour, because the stability of the whole region depends on Kosovo becoming a stable entity with sustainable institutions and a functioning economy. We must have no more black holes on the map of Europe.
In the short term, the international community will need to provide intensive assistance by supervising implementation of the settlement and missions to strengthen the rule of law. But the local leaders need to take responsibility for the future of Kosovo, and they will be accountable for outcomes, particularly full respect for minority rights. The Ahtisaari plan has good provisions for minority protection, which is why it is still on the table.
In the medium term, the tools that the Commission have developed through the enlargement process - for state-building and economic development - will be vital to ensuring Kosovans can stand on their own feet as the international community withdraws.
In parallel, we are advancing the European agenda in Serbia. We are close to concluding a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which I hope to be able to initial this Fall. Provided that all the conditions are met, including full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, I hope to see the Agreement signed early next year. This would help Serbia to turn the page and move on from nationalism of the past to the European future.
In the long term, the prospect of membership of the EU should be a beacon of light for those in Serbia and Kosovo who are working to re-join the European mainstream. This beacon motivated reformers in Central and Eastern Europe during the difficult days after the fall of the Berlin Wall. I trust it can also work in the most unstable parts of Europe today. That's why I have faith in a bright future for EU enlargement.
Thank you for your attention.
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