Sommaire: EU Presidency Statement - United Nations: Disarmament Commission (9 April 2007: New York)
Statement on behalf of the European Union, by H.E. Mr. Bernhard Brasack, Permanent Representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York
1. I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries Turkey, Croatia* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, and the EFTA country Liechtenstein, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this declaration.
2. As this is the first time that I take the floor please allow me to extend congratulations on your election as Chairman of the 2007 UNDC-session as well as to all members of the Bureau. The EU looks forward to working closely with you to achieve under your able guidance a successful outcome to the two agenda items.
3. The EU looks forward to constructive discussions and will do its utmost to achieve consensus on concrete recommendations to the next General Assembly. Our objective is to agree on "Recommendations for achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" and "Practical Confidence Building Measures in the Field of Conventional Arms". It is the EU's belief that at this stage of our work the holding of the debate still has the priority over the production of
documents if we want consensus to emerge. We would ask the Chairmen of Working Groups I and II to consider the points raised by the EU in the further work of the Working Groups.
4. The EU stresses the need for general and complete disarmament. Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control remain indispensable elements of cooperative security between states. There is broad agreement that the security of the international community continues to be challenged, both globally and regionally by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the risk that Non-State actors could gain access to those weapons. The discovery of clandestine
nuclear activities is of particular concern.
5. It is thus of utmost importance that all existing disarmament and non-proliferation agreements are effectively resourced, implemented and fully complied with. The EU believes that the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT are essential for global peace and security. The NPT provides the essential multilateral norm and the basis of all our endeavours to address the security challenges in the nuclear field. It is
based on three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In view of the current proliferation risks we are convinced that the NPT today is more important than ever; its authority and integrity must be preserved and strengthened. To this end the EU will continue to promote all the objectives laid down in the Treaty.
6. Our conviction, as expressed in the EU's Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD, is that a multilateral approach to non-proliferation provides the best means of countering the threat to international peace and security resulting from the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. We, therefore, regret that the 2005 NPT Review Conference was unable to agree on a substantive Final Document to address the most pressing challenges to the Treaty. In this perspective, it is even more
important that all States Parties work together to meet the challenges of the NPT and have an open and inclusive discussion in the run-up to the Review Conference of 2010. The EU will continue to work towards universal accession to the NPT, calling on all States not party to the NPT to undertake commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament and calling on those States to become States Parties to the NPT as non nuclear weapon States.
7. We are committed to make a constructive contribution to the NPT Review process which will start with the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee at the end of this month and lead up to the Review Conference in 2010. In this regard the EU continues to support the Decisions and the Resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and shall bear in mind the current situation. We note also that the final report, which
includes the programme of work, adopted by consensus at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, constitutes a reference for the upcoming review process in which the EU will engage on the basis of its Common Position adopted prior to the 2005 Review Conference.
8. We recognize that serious nuclear proliferation events have occurred since the end of the 2000 Review Conference.
9. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is as essential to nuclear disarmament as it is to non-proliferation. The occurrence of nuclear tests after the opening of the CTBT for signature underlines the need for as early entry into force of the Treaty as possible. The EU reiterates its call on States, particularly those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the said Treaty without delay and without conditions and, pending its entry into force to abide by a moratorium on nuclear
testing and to refrain from any action contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. The EU would also like to express its appreciation for the substantial work of the CTBT Organisation Preparatory Commission. We will continue to actively support the work of the Special Representative of the States which have ratified the Treaty in his work promoting universal accession.
10. The EU is strongly committed to reaching a consensus on a programme of work in the CD as soon as possible and welcomes the fact that new ideas and new proposals have been put forward in this regard over the last few years.
The EU is encouraged by the constructive, structured and substantive discussions in the course of this year's session and the momentum created by it. This has fostered our hope that the CD can resume significant work.
11. The EU attaches a clear priority to the negotiations, at the Conference on Disarmament, of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), as a means to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation. This was made clear in the Common Position adopted by the EU relating to the NPT Review Conference on April 25, 2005, and by which the EU stands.
12. The EU supports the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and welcomes the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since the end of the Cold War and stresses the need for an overall reduction of the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, in particular those with the largest arsenals. In this context, we recognise the application of the principle of irreversibility to guide all measures in the field of nuclear
disarmament and arms control, as a contribution to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability, taking these conditions into account. We are pursuing efforts to secure transparency as a voluntary confidence building measure.
13. The EU notes that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which reduced the US and Russia's strategic nuclear weapons arsenal to 6,000 accountable warheads, is due to expire in 2009. We welcomed the ratification of the Moscow Treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in 2002, while at the same time stressing the need for more progress in reducing their arsenals. We also note that the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which limits each side to no
more than 1,700 - 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, will expire on December 31, 2012. The EU welcomes the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons which START and the Moscow Treaty have brought about, and stresses the need for more progress in structurally reducing these nuclear arsenals through appropriate follow-on processes.
14. The EU also highlights the importance of implementation of the declarations made by the Presidents of Russia and the United States of America in 1991 and 1992 on unilateral reductions in their stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons and calling on all States with non-strategic nuclear weapons to include them in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination. The EU recognises the importance, from the point of view of nuclear disarmament,
of the programmes for the destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons and the elimination of fissile material as defined under the G8 Global Partnership.
15. Since security in Europe is linked to security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the EU puts particular importance on non-proliferation and disarmament issues in that region and, in this context, reiterates the urgent necessity of universalisation of the NPT and as early entry into force as possible of the CTBT.
16. The EU calls on all States in that region to make the Middle East into an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in keeping with the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
A solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery. The EU deplores Iran's failure to take the steps repeatedly required by the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council. It welcomes the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747.
17. The EU continues to attach great importance to the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs), established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among states of the regions concerned as elaborated in the guidelines adopted by the UNDC in its 1999 substantive session. Nuclear weapon free zones enhance regional and global peace and security and are a means to promote nuclear disarmament, stability and confidence. We welcome and support the signature and ratification by the nuclear weapon
states of the relevant protocols to the NWFZs following completion of the necessary consultations. We hope that outstanding issues concerning nuclear weapon free zones can be resolved through full consultations in accordance with the UNDC guidelines and with the agreement of all parties involved.
18. The EU pays particular attention to the need to enhance the detectability of violations, as a means to reinforce compliance with obligations established by the multilateral treaty regime. To this end particular emphasis is placed on making best use of existing verification mechanisms and, where necessary, establishing additional verification instruments. The EU supports strengthening the role of the UN Security Council which has the primary responsibility for safeguarding international
peace and security. The EU stresses, in particular, the absolute necessity of full compliance with all the provisions of the NPT by all States Parties.
19. The EU would like to highlight the IAEA's unique and positive role in verifying States' compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation commitments. The EU believes the international safeguards system of the IAEA is essential to the verification of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and to the success of this multilateral system. The EU considers that comprehensive Safeguards Agreements together with Additional Protocols have a deterrent effect on nuclear proliferation, form
today's verification standard and constitute the current IAEA verification standard. The EU would therefore like to reiterate its call for universal accession to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. EU Member States are also working towards making the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for sensitive nuclear exports.
20. The European Union continues to be committed to strong national and internationally co-ordinated export controls in order to complement our obligations under the NPT, and to support the strengthening of the Nuclear Supplier Group. The European Union urges the NSG and the Zangger Committee to share their experience on export controls with non-members to meet the new non-proliferation challenges arising from an increase of global trade in nuclear related goods.
21. Among the relevant multilateral instruments UNSC resolution 1540 plays a crucial role in developing an effective mechanism of prevention and counter proliferation of WMD, their means of production and delivery to or from states and non-state actors world-wide. We commend the 1540 Committee for engaging in activity in support of the resolution, and urge them to continue ever stronger with focussed outreach to those regions where implementation of the resolution is most urgent. We appreciate
the positive attitude of Member States towards the necessity of comprehensive national implementation of UNSCR 1540 and encourage States to continue in their efforts of national implementation consistent with the goal in UNSCR 1673 to reach by 2008 compliance through the achievement of implementation of all provisions of UNSCR 1540. The EU is ready to continue to provide assistance, in particular in building legal and administrative infrastructure, sharing our experience of implementation and
training respective national authorities.
22. We should not be detracted from other important tasks on the disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation agenda this year. These tasks are manifold and include a broad range of issues also relating to conventional weapons, in particular small arms and light weapons.
23. This year, the Disarmament Commission will also continue to work on practical confidence building measures in the field of conventional arms. We believe that the Chairman's perception paper of the 2003 session constitutes a good basis to build upon and to learn from previous problems. The goal of confidence building measures in the field of conventional arms is to strengthen international peace and security, improve relations among states and contribute to the prevention of war. The EU
hopes that this session will bring about fruitful discussions leading to concrete and comprehensive recommendations designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament. After years of discussion, the item should be sufficiently ripe for finalisation.
24. Cooperative approaches to arms control will often start with confidence-building measures (CBMs); they build relations between peoples, thus contributing to post-conflict stabilisation and rehabilitation. They create the climate of transparency, dialogue and cooperation which is the regular basis for arms control or disarmament agreements between the parties to a conflict and often a precondition for conflict prevention. CBMs have to be developed and agreed on a voluntary basis, they are
understood on the basis of the principle of cooperative security. The confidence building process is facilitated by good governance and the rule of law. CBMs should be in full accord with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law. It is important that all States in all regions feel that their participation in transparency- and confidence-building measures serves their security interests and builds security with neighbours.
25. Conflicts in various regions where CBMs have not been initiated at an early stage have shown the need for worldwide awareness of the potential of CBMs to contribute to peace and stability. This implies, inter alia, verification regimes that ensure the reliability of the information provided. CBMs, not only bilateral but also sub-regional and regional, have produced encouraging results world-wide in supporting peace and stability. We need more and enhanced dialogue on CBMs in order to
diffuse tensions in regional conflicts. A further security benefit of CBMs between states is that they build a network of Government experts who are better able to tackle transnational threats posed by non-state actors.
26. With regard to Europe the OSCE area is an encouraging example of how CBMs can contribute to the building of peace and stability on bilateral and regional level. Since the first CBMs were agreed at the Stockholm Conference in the mid-80s, the CFE Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty and the successive Vienna Documents have been instrumental in the creation of an open military culture to enhance transparency, confidence and trust. These documents, along with additional documents of the OSCE-acquis,
constitute a mutually reinforcing network for security in Europe, and are fully supported by the European Union. One important part of the OSCE-acquis on CBMs is the document " Stabilising Measures for localised Crisis Situations" adopted by the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in November 1993 which is intended to facilitate decision making in localised crisis situations through the use of CBMs. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security stipulates, inter alia, that
all armed forces must be under effective democratic and constitutional control and have clearly defined tasks. The EU expresses the hope that the UNDC will endorse these principles in its recommendations.
27. The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms constituted on the global level a significant and lasting step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters. In its 15 years of existence the UN Register has proven to be an effective international transparency- and confidence-building mechanism, which is under continuing review and development. A recent development of the Register is constituted by the newly adopted standardized form for SALW
notifications. The EU stresses the practical importance of including information on small arms and light weapons in Member States' annual report to the Register, using this form. The EU is committed to securing the widest possible participation in the register, and to improving its relevance and effectiveness in a way that continues to contribute to regional and sub-regional confidence-building efforts.
28. The same commitment is valid for the mechanism on "Objective information on military measures, including transparency of military expenditure". Transparency on military expenditure is an essential element of confidence between States and can thus help to relieve tension and contribute to conflict prevention. Measures directed towards strengthening and broadening participation should be developed.
29. Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects is a priority for the EU. By focussing inter alia on marking and tracing, brokering, transfer control criteria, stockpile management and the issue of ammunition, due process for SALW and its ammunition is established. This work leads to transparency and thus contributes to building confidence. The European Strategy on SALW and their ammunition
(adopted on 15 December 2005) formalised the Union's existing approach to small arms and light weapons. It is a strategy with a global scope, encompassing technical and financial assistance to a wide range of programmes and projects related to SALW and their ammunition.
30. The EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted in 1998 has introduced a high degree of transparency in arms transactions not only through building upon common criteria for arms exports, but also through the establishment of an information exchange and consultation mechanism. The EU also continues to attach great importance to the efforts of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA). These efforts include promoting
responsible export policies towards, and effective export controls over, small arms and light weapons, including MANPADS, in order to prevent their uncontrolled proliferation, destabilising accumulation and diversion. Such practices have, the EU believes, established the "gold standard" for such controls.
31. The EU firmly supports the elaboration of a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms within the framework of the United Nations. The EU and its individual Member States are committed to playing an active role in this process. The EU calls on all UN Member States actively to support the ATT process, to submit their views to the SG and participate in the work of the group of government
experts. The EU firmly believes that such an instrument, consistent with existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, would be a major contribution to tackling the undesirable and irresponsible proliferation of conventional arms which undermines peace, security, development and full respect for human rights.
32. The EU is concerned about the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions. We consider that this should be a vital element in the future work of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Against this background, the EU will make every effort to achieve substantive results on this important issue at the forthcoming CCW meetings in order to enhance the protection of the civilian population against the humanitarian hazards caused by cluster munitions.
33. I would like to reiterate the EU´s support for the full implementation and universalisation of the Ottawa Convention. We welcome the progress so far achieved. We call upon all States that have not yet done so to ratify or accede to the Convention as soon as possible. This is necessary to achieve our goal that there should be no more anti-personnel mine victims.
* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
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