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Hampton Court Consolidated Papers

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION THE SECRETARY GENERAL / HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, Brussels, 14 December 2005

Dear Prime Minister,

At their informal meeting at Hampton Court the Heads of State and Government noted the EU's rapid expansion in crisis management and its increasingly important role in the world. Following these discussions the Presidency asked me to take work forward in four specific areas and to provide initial orientations for the December meeting of the European Council.

I enclose four short papers covering the following areas

The approach in these papers is my own, though I have consulted the current and incoming Presidencies and the Commission. Two of the papers call for particular comment. The first paper (on capabilities) concerns the EU's Capabilities. These are not, however, the only capabilities of importance to us. For example - as the paper before the European Council on Strategy Partnership with Africa makes clear - it is of importance to us that the African countries, and the African Union, also develop their capabilities. Thus, though our primary interest is in improving our own capabilities and training, we also need to think about how we can improve our training to others.
The third paper (on Financing), deals with a complicated issue, in which the Commission has important responsibilities. My paper underlines the need to find a pragmatic way forward. I understand that the Commission will have some practical ideas to put forward shortly. I look forward to seeing them.

In this and in all the other areas I intend to take this work forward working closely with the Commission and with all Member States. I hope to have more detailed proposals to put to the Council over the next six months, though in some areas, such as consular protection, I fear the complexity of the subject may need a slightly longer timeframe.

I am copying this letter to all members of the European Council.

Javier SOLANA

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Improving our defence capabilities by increasing levels of research spending, finding opportunities for research collaboration, tackling capability gaps and collaborating as partners on training

I. INCREASING LEVELS OF RESEARCH SPENDING, FINDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH COLLABORATION.

1. R&T is crucial to our aspirations for European Defence. It is the seed-corn of our future equipment capabilities, and vital to the health of our defence technological and industrial base.

2. National defence investment programmes are difficult to re-orient. Long procurement cycles and financial pressures make it tough both to rebalance toward new capability needs, and to switch from national to collaborative approaches. But the place to focus is on R&T, both because such programmes are more flexible than major equipment programmes, and because successful collaborations require convergence at the earliest stages of exploration of new requirements and possibilities.

3. R&T is of fundamental importance for our future. The US is out-spending Europe by 5:1 in defence R&D. Calls for urgent action have been made by industry to increase the proportion of the whole spent collaboratively in Europe from less than 5% to 20%.

4. There is also a wider economic dimension - the contribution defence R&T can make to ensuring Europe's future as an innovative, knowledge-based, globally competitive economy.

5. The case for investing more, and investing more together, seems clear. The following practical steps should be taken in the coming months. Bringing defence or R&T programmes together is not easy in spite of the obvious logic and long term cost savings. There are many recent examples of failure. The EDA needs to be able to stimulate defence establishments into greater collaborative efforts, including through examining the option of preassigning some portion of national provision to collaboration and considering whether that would best be done through the EDA or via some other joint funding mechanism.6. Much of this will require debate with Member States and other stakeholders in coming months. The personal engagement of Defence Ministers will be crucial: and an important milestone will be the EDA Steering Board meeting in Innsbruck in early March.

II. TACKLING CAPABILITY GAPS

7. As noted above, the inflexibility of defence investment programmes is a major obstacle to rapid capability improvements. The priorities are widely recognised and will no doubt be confirmed by the work on Headline Goal 2010: deployed, multinational operations put a particular premium on such capabilities as :

• Command, Control and Communication (the Agency is already active)
  
• Surveillance and Reconnaissance (where the Agency must take forward work on unmanned air vehicles and space-related capabilities)
  
• Strategic lift, both air and sea (an immediate challenge for Battlegroups, and highly relevant to disaster relief)
  
• All aspects of casualty minimisation, i.e. protection of own forces and precision in the use of force
  
• Other "enabling" capabilities such as air-to-air refuelling (already reactivated in the EDA context) and logistics.

8. Given the pressures on defence budgets, different funding models should be considered - more use of private finance, extra-defence funding for specific projects, creation and protection of a "wedge" of uncommitted funding in forward defence investment plans to be reserved for the key capabilities. These options should be analysed in the EDA's Capabilities Steering Board.

9. Meanwhile, progressing the air-to-air refuelling initiative, tackling the strategic lift shortfall and pursuing improvements in command, control and communication should be the top priorities during the coming months.

III. TRAINING

10. Work on training should include efforts to coordinate training insde the Union (e.g. by promoting common/multinational training on the utilisation and maintenance of similar equipment, or developing a dedicated EU training programme for Battlegroups, which would be compatible with the NRF's training and exercises programme and would ensure exchange of lessons identified between battlegroup participants. Its implementation would be left to members of a given Batlegroup, under the responsibility of the respective framework nation);

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Ensuring our crisis management structures can meet the new demands on them including for responding to natural disasters

IV. CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

11. The Union's crisis management structures were created, out of nothing, five years ago. Since then twelve operations have been undertaken. These have helped both in preventing crises and in post-crisis normalisation. They have had a significant political impact. This has been a period of growth and success for the CFSP; but there is much the Union can do better.

12. We are currently close to the limits of our capacity. More money and more flexible financing procedures are required, as explained in a separate paper. The Secretariat is increasing its human resources for ESDP operations within its budgetary constraints. Further steps are needed, drawing on the experience of recent years, to increase efficiency, professionalism and also capacity.

Structures

13. The added value which the Union brings to crisis management is its ability to bring together civilian and military assets. Every crisis needs some mixture of civilian and military assets. Almost all military operations need civilian follow up; almost all civilian crisis management takes place in a security environment where military assistance may be needed. A comprehensive approach to strategy, planning and operation makes sense. The creation of the Civ/Mil Cell has been a step in the right direction, but does not go far enough. It should be seen as a pathfinder, leading the way to a more complete integration of civilian and military expertise within the Council's structures. A more integrated framework must remain fully capable for military operations, including cooperation with national headquarters and international organisations.

Capabilities

14. Particular attention needs to be paid to police resources and organization. It may be desirable for Member States to consider creating extra police capacity for deployment abroad. In today's world, such capacities can be as important for security as military resources.

15. The Union's largest 'civilian' assets are its aid programme and other Community policies, including both long-term measures and short-term interventions like the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and the future Stability Instrument. The more coherence that can be achieved between CFSP and ESDP actions and Community policies and programs, the greater the effectiveness of the EU. In some areas, such as DDR, ways should be explored of establishing joint teams and working more closely with the Commission during both planning and implementation to ensure that the Union is more effective in serving its interests and achieving its overall objectives.

Management of Operations

16. We have an increasing number of challenging missions (Rafah, Aceh, etc). Arrangements for management and control of these missions need to be strengthened. We have not yet been faced with a serious crisis in an operation. Steps should be taken to clarify the chains of command and responsibility and to ensure access to the planned operational facilities, so that we can deal with such situations twenty-four hours a day/seven days a week as necessary. (This should be without prejudice to the agreed TOR's for the facilities for an operations centre). These improvements can be informed by better arrangements for evaluation and learning lessons.

17. Many practical problems make the task of crisis management harder than it need be. These often stem from a lack of flexibility in procedures used when managing funds through the CFSP budget. Effective procedures have been devised for handling certain crisis situations (e.g. ECHO); similar flexibility needs to apply to ESDP crisis management operations taking account of the timescales involved and chains of command.

V. RESPONDING TO NATURAL DISASTERS

18. The Union has an array of instruments for responding to natural disasters, including the Commission's Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) for coordinating Member States' civil protection resources, and humanitarian assistance delivered through ECHO. Speed of response and delivery is essential to saving lives. Experience shows that military resources, in particular transport means, can make an important contribution to the response to a natural disaster. This is particularly the case when it is difficult to deliver relief through more normal means.

If the Union wishes to be ready to respond in this fashion we need:

• A decision making process that can react within hours of a disaster. The arrangements for emergency and crisis coordination recently agreed by the Council - a Crisis Steering Group consisting of the Presidency, Commission, the Council Secretariat and concerned Member States (doc.15106/05) - seem well adapted to this purpose.
  
• Timely planning of assistance with civil and military assets. This can be assisted by pre-identifying capabilities and generic force packages likely to be of the greatest utility. The EUMS, making use of the Civ-Mil cell, in consultation with the Commission, can take this work forward by developing generic plans and scenarios and by arranging for the procedures to be exercised.
  
• Arrangements for transport coordination of the relief effort. These should build on existing instruments. Coordination should cover: military assets made available by Member States (using the Eindhoven and Athens centres); and coordination between military assets and assistance mobilized through the MIC and ECHO. These efforts should be coordinated sensibly with those of other international actors including OCHA and NATO.

Making this work will of course depend on the extent to which EU Member States are able to make assets available.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

19. In addition to tackling practical problems, I recommend that:

• We restructure our organization to achieve the maximum possible civilian/military integration in all areas, taking into account the need for the Union to remain fully capable for conducting military operations;
  
• We put in place more robust arrangements for the management and control of missions and operations, involving clearer chains of command and responsibility and ensuring access to planned operational facilities;
  
• I come forward with suggestions for improving the planning and coordination of EU Member States for the speedy delivery of assistance, including through the use of military assets, in response to natural disasters, as well as scenarios to test them. I will build on the proposals made in the follow up to the Action Plan on the Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, in particular on consular protection.

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Increasing CFSP funding, with a better way to finance civilian operations rapidly

20. Over the last few years, the development of European Security and Defence Policy, particularly the launching of crisis management operations in the Balkans, Africa, Asia and the Middle East, has boosted the Union's influence and served its interests, as identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS). This is one of the EU's success stories.

21. The low overall level of funding for civilian crisis management operations, coupled with slow disbursement and procurement, have hampered the EU's ability to act. The quicker the Union acts, the greater the impact. The EU should always be in a position to respond quickly.

22. In accordance with the remit following the informal meeting of Heads of State or government at Hampton Court (doc. 13992/05), this note sets out orientations for (i) increasing CFSP funding; and (ii) ensuring rapid financing of civilian crisis management operations.

I. INCREASING CFSP FUNDING

Overall level of funding

23. At Hampton Court, there was general agreement on the need for a substantial increase in funds to cover the common costs of EU crisis management operations and other CFSP measures. The figure of € 300 million per annum suggested by one Head of government received widespread support. Given the Union's ambitions and capacities, this figure is not unreasonable.

24. Funding would need to be catered for in the context of the next Financial Perspective and the annual budget process. In any given year the actual funds required should be based on real, predictable needs, assessed by the Council, plus a sufficient margin for contingencies given the inherent unpredictability of crisis management.

Current funding arrangements for crisis management operations vary according to the operation's objectives and means, and command structure:

For "civilian" operations, costs borne by the EU are financed as a general rule from the CFSP budget. Additional costs are borne by Member States. Three practical drawbacks exist: it has not proved possible to fund operational preparations and fact-finding missions under the budget; funds can only be disbursed two to three weeks after adoption of the Joint Action launching the operation; and delays in procuring essential equipment are frequent and hamper effectiveness.

For "military" operations, the Athena mechanism was set up in 2004 to administer the common costs for such operations. This mechanism has worked well for financing all stages of such operations, including preparation and fact-finding missions. Funds can be disbursed immediately once the concept is agreed, and procurement can proceed swiftly, fully respecting the relevant Financial Regulation.

Addressing immediate needs for 2006

25. Estimates for CFSP needs in 2006, plus a contingency margin, total around €120 million (not including a possible operation in Kosovo). This is slightly more than the amount of € 102.6 million foreseen in the 2006 CFSP budget. Although this represents a significant increase over the 2005 budget, most of this money is already earmarked. So while most the costs for ongoing operations in 2006 should be financed from the budget, additional funding may be required, particularly if new operations are launched during the year.

Two options exist for additional funding:

Making budgetary transfers. Around six weeks are required to get agreement of both branches of the budgetary authority once the Commission has made a proposal. Little scope exists to compress these deadlines, and this procedure pre-supposes political will by all institutions to move rapidly. The Commission has indicated that it will study favourably making such proposals should the need arise;

Seeking contributions from Member States, in accordance with article 28(3) TEU. When such contributions are sought, proper arrangements are needed for administering and managing them.

II. A BETTER WAY TO FINANCE CIVILIAN OPERATIONS RAPIDLY

26. Heavy procedures are inherent in the current system. These hamper rapid financing and procurement. Greater coherence and simplified management structures are needed. Moreover, differentiating the sources of financing operations depending on whether they are "civilian" or "military" is not always possible. No such distinction exists in the Treaty in Article 17 TEU. Article 28(3) TEU distinguishes between CFSP expenditure and expenditure "arising from operations having military or defence implications". The reality is that many crisis management operations in the modern world require rapid response and a combination of instruments used in an integrated manner. The recently established Civ/Mil Cell was conceived with this reality in mind.

27. Rapid disbursement of funds is needed when (a) CFSP budget funding is not available for civilian operations; or (b) operational preparation or fact finding work are necessary to launch an operation. In both cases, practical solutions urgently need to be found if the Union wishes to launch civilian operations or missions rapidly and effectively in future.

III. ORIENTATIONS FOR CARRYING WORK FORWARD

28. More money is needed to meet the Union's ambitions in this area. Funds should accordingly be provided by continuing to increase the CFSP budget chapter in line with real predictable needs assessed by the Council, plus a sufficient margin for contingencies. Procedures for streamlining the processes by which funds are made available should also be developed urgently.

29. If, for whatever reason, funds under the CFSP budget are not available, contributions may be made by Member States in accordance with Article 28(3) TEU. To ensure rapid financing in such an eventuality, a permanent mechanism is needed for administering and managing such contributions in a transparent and accountable manner respecting the principles of sound financial management. This would avoid lengthy discussions to determine ad hoc arrangements before launching each operation or mission.

30. More rapid disbursement of funds for civilian crisis management operations also requires solutions to ensure that: (a) operational funding is available immediately for preparatory and fact-finding missions; (b) funds can be rapidly disbursed when needed in all phases of a crisis management operation, in particular as soon as the operation is launched; and (c) procurement of essential equipment can occur speedily. Until now, we have muddled through. We urgently need to consider how to achieve these objectives by:
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Ensuring the EU is ready to assume greater responsibility in Kosovo
Improving the coordination of EU action in the Balkans, especially on organised crime

VII. ENSURING THE EU IS READY TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITY IN KOSOVO.

I have submitted to the GAERC a joint report with Commissioner Rehn on the future EU role. Here also the EU is likely to find itself with a prominent part to play and a number of different instruments to coordinate. The situation will be different from that of Bosnia where the institutional pattern is longer established (and where the EU is also responsible for the main peacekeeping force). It may however be even more delicate politically. We shall make further reports to the GAERC on this issue.

VIII. IMPROVING THE COORDINATION OF EU ACTION IN THE BALKANS

31. The coordination of EU action in the Balkans has made progress in the last years. In particular the Stabilisation and Association process has provided a comprehensive framework both for individual countries and for the region as a whole. The Union's activity in the region is nevertheless characterized by a multiplicity of actors and instruments: EU Special Representatives, Commission Delegations, Member States' Diplomatic Missions, EUMM, the European Agency for Re-construction, Police and Military Operations.

32. In an ideal world we would operate a clear strategy, through a co-ordinated chain of command, and would deliver a coherent message from the EU in the Balkans. Effective "coordination" depends on the active engagement and common sense of those concerned. In this respect, there is room for improvement.

33. The countries in the region that have been the focus of EU attention are each at different stages and present different problems:

In Skopje the Council and the Commission have now appointed the same person to be the EU Special Representative and Commission Head of Delegation. This was a sensible and pragmatic response to a particular need.

In Sarajevo we will face a particular challenge next year if the Office of the High Representative (OHR) transitions to an office of a EU Special Representative.

Recommendation

34. We should ask ourselves whether we can find a way of creating a more unified structure in the Balkans. I am convinced that we will achieve more if we can create a more coherent and unified structure under strong and sensitive political leadership. This is a matter on which we all need to reflect further. I would welcome the views of both the Commission and the Council.

III. ORGANISED CRIME

35. Organised crime in the Balkans constitutes a serious political, economic and security problem for the countries of the region, and is a major source of crime in EU member states.

36. In recent years, the EU has developed a number of instruments to support the fight against organised crime, and is actively engaged almost everywhere in the region. The range of instruments is impressive: EUROPOL,EUROJUST, Border Control Agency, ESDP missions, Commission activities, notably thanks to the CARDS programme, dialogue under Stabilisation and Association Agreement structures and OLAF, Member States activities etc.

Tackling organised crime requires political commitment and courage; we need to ensure that the need to take bold, determined political action becomes a firm and regular feature of our discussions with the leaders and political actors in the region and a constant feature of our communications strategy.

The planned Ministerial Conference on organised crime, that will be organised by the incoming Austrian Presidency in Vienna on the 4/5 May 2006, and the mandate given by the Justice and Home Affairs Council to the Presidency (working with the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission) to produce in 2006 an action oriented paper on "...improving co-operation on organised crime, corruption, illegal immigration and counter-terrorism, between the EU, Western Balkans and relevant ENP countries" will constitute important steps in carrying this work forward.

ESDP operations in the Western Balkans region offer an opportunity, within the framework of their mandate, to support local capacityand extend the fight against organised crime to countries of origin or transit. These operations need to be dovetailed with the considerable assistance provided through Community projects, which inter alia supports institution-building activities in the field of security.

Recommendations

37. To improve coordination between the various instruments and policy activities involved, I recommend a threefold approach:

• We need a thorough assessment of the impact of organised crime in the Balkans. I suggest that the SITCEN and EUROPOL should be invited to carry out this analysis and to submit an assessment to the Council by March 2006, if possible jointly;
  
  
• On the basis of this analysis we should adopt a comprehensive strategy to tackle Western Balkans organised crime. This should set priorities, so that the many bodies concerned can direct their activities towards a coherent set of goals. This comprehensive strategy should also involve the beneficiary countries who have a vital interest in ensuring the rule of law;
  
  
• Within this framework we should look also at information flows to ensure effective communication among the many EU bodies concerned, as well as with the local authorities.

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