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Options for a significant EU role in reconstruction in Iraq

The EU reaffirms its commitment to play a significant role in the political and economic reconstruction of the country (Presidency's Statement on Iraq, Athens 16/4/2003)

The EU needs to decide how to translate its previous general statements of principle into policy decisions. Following the invitation of the 20th March European Council, the Council Secretariat and the Commission submitted contributions to the Council discussions on the basis of previous EU experiences in crisis situations. These outlined some key principles the Council might agree on the guide possible EU involvement:

• Iraqi sovereignty: preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty combined with the right of the Iraqis to choose their own political future and to control their own natural resources;
  
  
• A legitimate interim administration firmly based on international law : this would be assured by a central role for the United Nations built on UNSC resolution. The Interim Administration could combine existing Iraqi administrative structures with a role for the diaspora.
  
  
• Mobilising support of the international community: this requires international coordination of the needs assessment and donor contributions; international review of Iraq's sanctions regime, debt burden and building of a framework for deciding on oil concessions.

In order to have a sound basis for an international contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq, an appropriate framework must be put in place. Without political agreement amongst Ministers it would be impossible for the Commission to be as pro-active as it has been in other post-conflict re-constructions such as Kosovo, East Timor or Afghanistan. Ministers might therefore focus on identifying what the key elements of such a framework should be:

• Should the EU define more precisely what would constitute a central role for the UN ? Should this be a technical or a political role?
  
  
• Beyond the suspension or lifting of sanctions, should the EU favour the adoption of new Security Council resolution/s ? What should these deal with?
  
  
• What should be the EU view on key issues such as the continuation, adjustment or phasing out of the OFF programme, the international involvement in managing Iraq's debt burden, or an international umbrella for the management of Iraq's natural resources ?

The following sections give a preliminary overview of what the EU could do within an acceptable international framework. Some of the immediate actions would constitute preparatory work for a possible, more substantial, EU involvement in the medium term, as and when the necessary political elements have been put in place.

1. Possible actions include:

• Humanitarian Work: Member States and the Commission have been active since the start of the military conflict. The Commission is currently assessing the possibility to open an ECHO office in Baghdad at the earliest possible date (this would not prejudge the future opening of a Commission's office/delegation).
  
  
• Relief and Rehabilitation : Member States and The Commission could extend their humanitarian work into these areas. For example, emergency rehabilitation of damaged and looted health and education infrastructures, water supply and sanitation, energy and communications networks, anti-personnel mine and unexploded bomb removal.
  
  
• A system of information exchange could be established amongst the Commission and Member States development agencies on contributions to the reconstruction effort (clearing house).
  
  
• If sanctions are suspended/removed, rapidly suspending/repealing EU Regulation 2465/96. Repeal would automatically result in Iraq benefiting from GSP preferences. Consideration could also be given to how, without a sanctions regime, the EU could prevent trade in antiquities from Iraq.
  
  
• Consider the deployment of a high-level EU Mission to the region to seek views of neighbouring states, to invite them to remain constructive and to identify how they intend to contribute to the stabilization of Iraq.
  
  
• Participate in international needs assessment operations and donor coordination. Past experience strongly suggests that an early involvement in needs assessment exercises would give strategic focus to the subsequent EU role in the reconstruction programme, thus maximizing its impact and visibility.
  
  
• Structure a dialogue with the International Financial Institutions on Gulf War reparations and Iraqi debt isues. A meeting could be convoked through the Luxembourg process (EU/WB/IMF/IDB).
  
  
• Contribute to ensuring public order and pre-empting the emergence of organized crime through the deployment of EU/bilateral civilian police mission(s).
  
  
• Consider whether the return of Member State Embassies to the country can be achieved in a co-ordinated manner.

2. What could the EU do if the International Framework is acceptable?

The EU has acquired a wealth of practical experience and knowledge in reconstruction operations (Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan) and in long-term co-operation activities in the region (MEA, PHARE).

On this basis, the EU has the capacity to undertake actions in a wide variety of fields. Some examples are given below for illustrative purposes. However, any such undertakings would have to be carefully planned and in a particular based on:

i) a needs assessment
ii) co-ordination with Member States, other donors and international organizations
iii) close association of the Iraqi beneficiaries with the reconstruction process in order to ensure ownership.

The following is an illustrative list of the type pf activities which could be envisaged. It is useful to divide these activities according to three phases in the reconstruction process because it highlights the importance of sequencing issues:

Phase 1: Until establishment of an interim authority

• Humanitarian/relief/rehabilitation operations as well as contribution to security on the ground through civilian police missions.

Phase 2: Form interim administration to national elections

• Co-operation in the political sphere could include providing advice to constitutional commission and assisting a re-conciliation process. Also, information and media activities could be undertaken to promote public understanding of and support for the reconstruction process.
  
  
• Support to institution building would aim to re-establish the capacity of central and local administration, including customs and border controls. This would involve providing both policy advisers and strengthening administrative structures. In parallel, assistance could be given to the development of civil society (trade unions, business organizations, NGOs) Reform of the legal system, in particular in the commercial field.
  
  
• In the economic sphere further support could be given to developing energy, water, transport and communications infrastructure.
  
  
• In the social sphere, assistance could be given to consolidate the delivery of public services, particularly education and health. The EU could make available its experience in rural development and support employment creation activities.

Phase 3: national elections and after

• Support in political, economic and social spheres would continue, in particular.
  
  
• Assistance could be provided to the holding of elections.
  
  
• Support could be given to structural reforms in the economy. Economic links between the EU and Iraq could be strengthened through co-operation on trade, investment and regulatory convergence as well as sectoral co-operation and support to development of the productive sector. The signature of co-operation agreement with Iraq could be envisaged.

3. What can the EU do in/with neighbouring region?

The EU has a strong interest in the prosperity, stability and peace of the region. It is using its close links to support the political, economic and social development of the region. In the light of the Iraq crisis, this relationship needs to be enhanced politically and where possible financially, by fully exploiting the great potential of existing mechanisms. There is in particular a case for the EU to:

• Ensure progress in the Israel - Palestinian peace process by the resolute implementation of the Quartet roadmap, contributing to the monitoring mechanism and continuing support for Palestinian reforms.
  
  
• Help Jordan's and Egypt's efforts to cope with the domestic political and economic implications of the war in Iraq by for example, front-loading assistance when possible.
  
  
• Encourage Syria to seize the opportunity to move forward for a rapid conclusion of the Association Agreement negotiations and engaging with Syria on more active talks on its regional role, including Lebanon.
  
  
• Emphasize links between the political and the trade and cooperation negotiations with Iran, highlighting the need for swift progress in the political arena and for a constructive engagement for example by signing the IAEA Optional Protocal.
  
  
• Increase contacts with the Gulf Cooperation Countries to seek their views on theis possible involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq, in particular on addressing Iraq's debt/war reparations, outstanding payments and on promoting investments in Iraq.
  
  
• Further develop political dialogue with Turkey on common interests in the Middle East region, taking account inter alia of Turkey's good relations with Israel and thus engaging Turkey in EU efforts to end the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The EU could also intensify the dialogue with Turkey as regards ensuring the territorial integrity of Iraq.

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• EU Presidency's Statement on Iraq (16/4/2003)